Introduction
Interpersonal (or generalized) trust is a key component of social capital which determines a society's capacity for collective action. A huge body of empirical and theoretical research shows its importance for the economic and institutional development of nations: their economic outcomes, the quality of governance and political accountability, teaching practices and educational achievements, physical and mental health, happiness (see Algan, Cahuc, 2013 for a comprehensive overview of the classic and recent studies). However several problems need to be mentioned.
The first and most important issue is that a lot of areas and specific mechanisms of the potential influence of trust remain unexplored. For example, a number of studies argue that trust affects economic outcomes (e.g. Knack, Keefer, 1997 and Algan, Cahuc, 2010) , but what are the precise channels of influence? These can be entrepreneurial activity, preferences for different types of economic activities or the demand for some particular government policy (such as redistribution policy).
Second, many results are based upon datasets provided by World Values Survey (WVS), European Values Study (EVS) or General Social Survey (GSS) and thereby reflect relationships
for the whole world or for a limited set of developed countries. There is a dearth of such research for transitional and developing countries. It is especially true for Russia which has only few studies on social capital and trust (see e.g. Marsh, 2000 , Rose, 2000 , Kennedy et al., 1998 Finally, huge efforts were devoted to the evaluation of the positive outcomes of social capital and trust. It is still the main strand of research (see Algan, Cahuc, 2013) . However this view on social and economic outcomes of social capital is quite one-sided. It would be worthwhile to pay attention to the potential darker sides of social capital. Bonding social capital could hamper economic growth and undermine economic activity, the same could be true for antisocial norms that are widespread in developing and transition countries.
In this paper we study the connection between generalized trust and preferences over redistribution to different groups of people. It has already been shown that such preferences are driven by a large set of different parameters such as fairness and altruism (Alesina, Angeletos, 2005 , Luttens, Valfort, 2012 , Fong et al., 2006 , cultural values (Luttmer, Singhal, 2011) , public 5 Similar argument mentioned in (Yamamura, 2012) , who emphasizes that "existing literature on redistribution preferences has focused largely on Western countries". But according to him it's worthwhile to study Asian countries as they have different type of culture.
4 values (Corneo, Gruner, 2002) , historic experience (Alesina, Giuliano, 2011) , political views (Alesina, Giuliano, 2011) . The role of trust and social norms seems to be underexplored.
Several papers show importance of interpersonal trust (Bergh, Bjørnskov, 2014 , Bjørnskov, Svendsen, 2013 , trust and civicness (Algan et al., 2014) , social norms (Sabatini et al., 2014) , and community participation (Yamamura, 2012) for redistribution preferences. All these variables have a significant impact on the size of the welfare state (measured e.g. as total government expenditure as in Bjørnskov, Svendsen, 2013) or preferences over redistribution (measured by public opinion surveys). But different groups of people who the government should help are overlooked.
Overall the literature provides an answer to the important question of how much to redistribute (or whether redistribute or not) but does not ask how to redistribute. On the other hand, the relationship between social capital indicators and redistribution preferences could be more nuanced, in particular with more precise questions about redistribution policies such as questions about the groups of people who should actually be supported by the state. Higher levels of trust could lead to more support for one group of people and less for others, thus helping the former and hampering the latter. Overall it could provide unpredictable outcomes for economic growth and growth promoting policies should account for it.
We use data for Russia provided by its Public Opinion Fund. Within country surveys have an important advantage over international data as the variability of formal institutions is lower. Moreover, omitted variables, if present, seem to be quite the same for all regions because of the identical historical and institutional background for the regions of one country.
Measurement error also should be smaller and the same for all regions as all questions are in one language and there is no problem of translation and different meanings of words in different cultures. Overall these facts could lead to higher quality of results. Although the problem of external validity arises. A separate survey is needed to understand whether the results are country specific.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses preferences over redistribution and formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 gives a general background on Russian inequality and redistribution policies. Section 4 explains our data and empirical strategy, and section 5 continues with the results. Section 6 concludes.
Redistribution Preferences: Who to Help and Why?
The idea that not only the size of the redistribution matters but its targets as well as the overall philosophy of the welfare stare was pioneered by Esping-Andersen (1990) Although no nation has any single type of welfare state regime, and noticeable problems with the classification of individual countries were discovered (Scruggs, Allan, 2008) , EspingAndersen's typology had a significant impact on later research. There were attempts to include additional regime types into the classification, such as post-socialist, characterized by holdovers of a centrally planned economy like subsidized housing and energy prices (Kääriäinen, Lehtonen, 2006; Oorschot, Arts, 2005 (Kääriäinen, Lehtonen, 2006; Oorschot, Arts, 2005) . These studies were carried out on cross-country samples of European nations, and typically treated welfare state regimes as exogenous. One possible hypothesis assumes that there is the possibility of crowding out private pro-social behaviour and civic values by government actions which make social capital redundant. On the other hand, the universalism of welfare states creates social homogeneity and solidarity, which is beneficial for interpersonal trust (Kumlin, Rothstein, 2005) .
In this study, we take advantage of the similarity, if not identity, of welfare state regimes across Russian regions because of the federal social policy and Soviet-era inertia. This allows us to employ cross-regional variation in social capital to explain differences not in welfare state regimes but in popular preferences for social policies, which under democracy translate into an actual choice of welfare state regime.
We see two possible mechanisms that may explain any possible correlation between trust and preferences to redistribute to one group of people or another. In the presence of bonding social capital (which is common for Russia) higher interpersonal trust could lead to lesser demand for government support in favour of the poor, the homeless, those having many children and others who are in difficult situations. The underlying assumption for this is straightforward.
People may expect help from other people which substitutes support from the government. So they do not want the government to help those who are in need. Hypothesis 1 is the following:
Hypothesis 1: Substitution hypothesis. In an environment with higher trust people prefer less government redistribution to the poor, the homeless and others in difficult situations.
But living in a region with higher trust may push people to reward those who have done something noticeable for their country or to help those who are in great trouble and need special assistance which could be provided by the government. Higher norms of pro-social behaviour in a place with higher level of generalized trust could lead to the demand for support in favour of distinguished teachers and doctors, war veterans as well as the disabled.
Hypothesis 2: Civicness hypothesis. In an environment with higher trust people want more government support for distinguished society members and the disabled.
Inequality and Redistribution Policy in Russia
The existing design of public redistribution systems explains much in the preferences for redistribution. People want more or less redistribution depending on the share of wealth being redistributed and the existing support of different groups of people. The current level of inequality can also play a significant role.
For Russia significant economic inequality is a major concern. Russia's Gini index was 41.7 in 2011 6 . The income gap in Russia is wider than in most European countries, including those of Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to many developed countries, in Russia there are also great differences in incomes between regions 7 . Therefore our work requires careful control for wealth inequality.
The Russian welfare system has relatively low funding. The Independent Social Policy
Institute estimates show that the share of social expenditure of GDP in 2010 was only 14.2 per 7 cent. This is significantly lower than OECD average in the same year (22 per cent), although it is still higher than in middle-income OECD countries like Chile, Mexico and Republic of Korea 8 .
In addition to relatively scarce funding, the Russian social welfare system has difficulties in targeting resources towards those who are actually in need. According to Ovtcharova (2001) , the Soviet welfare system had two main objectives: to reward meritorious citizens (such as WWII veterans, Chernobyl nuclear disaster responders) and to provide basic social insurance like pensions and free healthcare. In the 1990s, this merit-oriented bias of social welfare was deepened when the Communist-oriented Duma alongside with regional governments introduced dozens of in-kind privileges based on relatively simple, easily-monitored formal criteria such as being veteran, retiree, disabled person or having many children. In 2005, these in-kind privileges were largely replaced with lump sum transfers; however, this brought no changes to the overall redistribution pattern. According to Independent Social Policy Institute transfers to the poor accounted for only 3.5 per cent of social expenditures in 2010 9 . When it comes to increasing welfare spending, the government typically chooses to raise pensions.
Social welfare responsibilities in Russia are shared between the Federation and the regional governments. Federal-level social protection is uniform across regions although some policies may target special regions like northern ones. Regional-level welfare policies may vary across jurisdictions although they should comply with federal regulations. However, there is significant variation among regions in per capita social spending. In 2011, the minimum was 947 rubles in Nenetskiy autonomous okrug and the maximum was 233,000 rubles in Moscow. These disparities can only be partly explained by regional differences in demography and public finance capacities and make it necessary to control for social expenditures.
Data and Methodology

Empirical information
Data for the study comes from several sources. Respondents are not wealthy. Almost 10% of households lack money even for food, 42%
of households can get enough food and clothes but cannot afford to buy domestic appliances.
45% of the respondents reported that social benefits and allowances are very important for their budget. Middle class families comprise about 23% of the sample. More detailed characteristics of the sample could be found in Table A1 of the Appendix.
Official statistics are used as our second source mainly to provide proper regional level controls. They are GRP per capita, social expenditure, the share of people below subsistence level, the Gini index, the ethnic fractionalization index, and the level of urbanization. A detailed description and summary of the statistics for the main variables are in Tables A2, A3 .1 and A3.2 of the Appendix.
Empirical strategy
The 2011 survey forms the basis of our research as it is the only one that contains workers, families with children, one-parent families and families with many children, the disabled, retirees, the unemployed?" Up to three answer choices for this question could be made.
The distribution of answers is presented at Figure 1 . We construct an index on a scale from -3 to +3 where positive points are given for the preferences in favour of distinguished or disabled people (labour and war veterans, combat operations participants, distinguished teachers and doctors, pensioners, the disabled) and negative points for those who are in difficult situation but to our belief could still work harder 10 It can be also treated as tolerance of inequality. We are grateful to Daniel Treisman for this notion. (the poor, the homeless, families with children, one-parent families and families with many children, the unemployed). 11 We also use a modified version of this index, without the disabled, and construct a separate dummy for the disabled. All these versions are described in are for GRP per capita, social expenditures, share of people below subsistence minimum/ Gini index, the ethnic fractionalization index, the level of urbanization, and the perceived level of corruption.
Explaining Preferences over Redistribution
Trust and Preferences over Redistribution
Results for the general question on inequality and redistribution are presented in Table 1 .
All estimations include the basic set of individual and regional level control variables described in a previous section.
Generalized trust matters both statistically and economically suggesting that people with higher levels of trust have lower tolerance of inequality 15 . The results are robust for different sets of control variables, including the Gini coefficient, poverty, urbanization. The effect of trust is twice as large as the effect of gender and as strong as the effect of social expenditure in a region.
This provides us with a link to previous research by Algan et al. (2014) , where there is a positive and economically significant influence of trust on preferences over redistribution.
Although we cannot claim a causal link between trust and preferences over redistribution we have some evidence that it could be the case. First, by definition higher generalized trust leads to higher levels of support for unknown people. Thus a more equal society could be perceived as fairer and more redistribution could be supported. Second, the regional level of trust reflecting the overall atmosphere and not individual trust helps us alleviate the reverse causality problem. But of course reverse causality is still possible and preferences over redistribution could shape generalized trust.
14 As 2008 and 2011 surveys provide a bit different personal information the set of individual controls slightly varies for 2008 and 2011 dependent variable estimations. These details are mentioned in the notes for specific tables. This set of individual control variables is quite common for studies of redistribution preferences (see e.g. Alesina, Giuliano, 2011 , Yamamura, 2012 and Algan et al, 2014 15 Table 1 
5.2.Redistribution to Different Groups of People
First we present the results for the general index described in section 3. Column (1) of Table 2 presents our baseline regression. Controls for poverty, inequality, corruption and regional social spending are included separately in columns (2)- (5) and provide a robustness check of our base finding. 16 Results could be requested from the authors. Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Trust is for 2007. All estimations include individual controls for gender, age, age squared, nationality, religion, wealth, education, occupation, importance of social benefits for household budget, city size, and regional controls for ethnolinguistic fractionalization and GRP per capita. * Indicate significance at resp 10% level. ** Indicate significance at resp 5% level. *** Indicate significance at resp 1% level.
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These results show that higher trust is connected with higher levels of support for redistribution in favour of those who perform services for their homeland or can't work because of health problems or age. Less support is found for people in difficult life situations who still are able to work. In order to examine mechanisms of relationship between trust and preferences over redistribution carefully we provide the following robustness check. First we do regressions for the disabled dummy as a dependent variable because this group is different from the rest of people who gain positive points in index: the others may be classified as those who did a service for their homeland while the disabled people might not have done it. So we tried another version of the redistribution index which is our initial redistribution index modified by exclusion of the "disabled" category. The estimation for the alternative index and for "disabled" category is provided in tables 3 and 4.
14 Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Trust is for 2007. All estimations include individual controls for gender, age, age squared, nationality, religion, wealth, education, occupation, importance of social benefits for household budget, city size, and regional controls for ethnolinguistic fractionalization and GRP per capita. * Indicate significance at resp 10% level. ** Indicate significance at resp 5% level. *** Indicate significance at resp 1% level. Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Trust is for 2007. All estimations include individual controls for gender, age, age squared, nationality, religion, wealth, education, occupation, importance of social benefits for household budget, city size, and regional controls for ethnolinguistic fractionalization and GRP per capita. * Indicate significance at resp 10% level. ** Indicate significance at resp 5% level. *** Indicate significance at resp 1% level.
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The trust coefficient in the specifications in Tables 3 is quite similar to the coefficients in Table 2 . Table 4 reveals an insignificance of trust for redistribution to disabled persons. Overall our hypotheses is supported by the data, although a more careful examination of this topic is needed.
Concluding Comments
Preferences over All estimations include individual controls for gender, age, age squared, nationality, religion, wealth, education, occupation, importance of social benefits for household budget, city size. * Indicate significance at resp 10% level. ** Indicate significance at resp 5% level. *** Indicate significance at resp 1% level.
